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A STATE BOARD.
Why should Pennsylvania not have a
central board of examiners for all candidates for the bar? The Bar Association
has recently been agitating for uniform
rules. Its recommendations have been
before the courts for over two years. In a
few counties they have been acceded to.
In a majority, they have produced, apparently no result at all. Indeed, if the
counties are willing to accept a uniform
standard, there can be no reason for withholding the power to regulate that standard. from a body of lawyers representing
the ability of the bar of the entire state.
The only object of insisting on local control over standard, is to be allowed to
maintain a standard which might differ
from the one that the general sense of the
state would approve.
Are the reasons for multiple standards
sufficient? Is it impracticable or improper,
that the lawyer in Bedford, or Cumberland
or Lackawanna, should have the same
qualifications, be as honest, as old, as
learned in literature, as learned in law, as
his brother in Philadelphia or Pittsburg?
We are not willing to concede that it is.
In all counties a fair amount of erudition
should be required, and in none, should
unreasonably severe exactions be made.
It is quite evident that there can not in
fact be similar standards in the various

counties, so long as different boards of examiners apply the tests. These boards differ vastly in knowledge, skill and soundness of sense. In one, the examinations
will be in the hands of one or two narrowminded pedants, in another, under the
control of indolent, or ignorant lawyers,
who believe in letting in anybody that
dares to apply.
But, what is worse than inequality between the various counties, is the inequality in the same counties. Thecommittees
change frequently in some counties. In
some the examinations are often short and
cursory. But, when any candidate happens not to be agreeable to the committee,
they have power indefinitely to increase the
stringency of their tests. The complaint
is occasionally heard, that gross, and indeed
mean, favoritism is displayed by committees. With a "pull" political, social, or
business, almost anyone, it is said, can be
admitted. Without it, a potential Eldon
or Mansfield or Marshall could not be.
The bar isaccused,with someshow ofjustice, of being a close corporation. Of all the
ranks of men, it only, has the power ofsaying who shall be admitted to its company.
It forms a trades-union, that prescribes the
length of apprenticeship and the qualifications, and, then insists o deciding in each
particular case, whether the candidate has
attained them. If the grocers of a borough
could pass on the privilege of any citizen
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to open a new grocery store we should expect little justice either to the candidate or
to the public in the exercise of their power.
Is the case so very different in which a
small group of lawyers at a county town,
jealous of competition, and complaining
often of dwindling business, have the power to say who -shall or shall not be added to
their number?
It is evident that some of these evils
would be remedied, if a board composed
of able and high-minded lawyers, selected
from the state at large, and retaining their
powers for a long term, were created. This
board would not reflect the local prejudices
friendly or hostile to particular candidates
for admission. It would have continuity
of policy. The reward annexed to their
office would be an equivalent for the time
devoted to thorough and painstaking examinations. We should be glad if in this
respect our state could become assimilated
to New York and other states.

The present Junior class has been divided into three sections, each one of which
will be required to attend one per week of
the three weekly moot courts. The first
court is held on Monday night, with Dr.
Trickett sitting as judge, the second is
held on Tuesday night, with Professor
Woodward, judge, and the third is held
Thursday night, with Hon. W. F. Sadler,
sitting asjudge. The required attendance
is not extended to the two upper classes
but the Dean expects all the members of
those classes to be present at the sittings
of the court, as frequently as possible.

It is very gratifying to note the success
with which the law graduates are meeting
in their various communities. In the
Alumni list of this month, are noted several instances in which these graduates
have attained coveted positions, being successful over men who are older both in years
and in the practice, than themselves.
It is the careful student and the trained mind that always tells in the end, surMOOT COURT.
passing and overtopping those who have
not had, or not taken a steady course of
A change has been made in the manner
training. 'The drift of the more thoughtof conducting the moot court of the Jun- ful and prudent of those who intend enterior class, which will prove beneficial along
ing into the profession of the law, is tendthe lines for which it is intended, and'will
ing more and more steadily toward the
greatly enhance the value of.the training
course provided in the law schools. And
students receive in the trial of cases, in
why shouldn't it? Here the student is
the moot courts of the Dickinson School
brought into constant contact with "men
of Law. Heretofore, -the counsel simply
trained in the law. who make it their
argued their case, presented their briefs to
business, and devote large portions of their
the court, and a decision was handed
time to the instruction of those who come
down, deciding the question of law, only,
under them, and the benefit to be derived
without additional comment upon the
therefrom is more manifest and evident
manner of conducting the case, ability or
than theoretical. The more thorough and
inability of counsel, their manner of ex- careful a man is in
his preparation for the
pression, etc. Hereafter, the decision of
practice, the greater will be the success
the court will be handed down, as before,
with which he will meet, when he finally
and in addition, council will receive inenters the profession. The truth of this
struction upon the conduct of the case.
statement is evidenced by the experience
The arguments will be criticized both hs
of the graduates to whom we have just reto their argumentative and as to their
ferred. A bright but untrained mind may
rhetorical efforts.
Deficfencies Will be
meet with success for a time, but its
pointed out, and the men will be instruct- strength, like powder's flash,
flares up and
ed how to alter and improve their reasoathen dies down, only succeeding by its moings, so that they will not only learn how
mentary brilliancy, in leaving the darkness
to look up the law upon a case, but will
more profound, while the student, who has
also become proficient in summing up the
received a careful training, constantly adresults of their labors in a strong, logical. vances and meets with well
earned and
and conning manner.
much deserved reward.
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COIMENCEMENT ORATOR.
The Hon. St. Clair McKelway, LL. D.,
the distinguished editor of the Brooklyn
.Eagle,has consented to deliver the Commencement address before the School of
Law on the evening of Tuesday, June 6th.
Dr McKelway's services are in constant
demand for college Commencement occasions and he is regarded by competent
judges as being not only one of the foremost editors of the United States but one
of the most accomplished orators and publicists as well. The School of Law is to be
congratulated on having secured the services of so able and noted a man.

THE SCHOOL.
A large number of the law students took
advantage of the close proximity of Harrisburg, and adjourned to that city on
January 17th, to help inaugurate Governor
Stone.
During the past week, the Junior class
held an election for class historian. Mr.
Rothermel was the lucky candidate,
chosen from among a number of competitors.
IcDonald of Pittsburg, entered the law
school at the opening of the present term.
Mr. McDonald intends taking the full
course.
The term opened on January 11th, with
all the students returned from their various homes. This term is the long term of
the school year, extending from January to Commencement, which is held
in June. The vacations at Easter are
usually of such short duration, that the
faculty deem it better to continue the exercises than to suspend them for the very
few days at that time.
The members of the upper classes who
graduate in June are working on their
graduating theses. Every student who
graduates, is required to write a thesis on
some legal subject, chosen by himself and
approved of by the dean, which must
have a minimum length of fifty pages

of legal cap. The preparation of these
theses is of much value to the student,
since he must study the various cases applying to his thesis and involve their doctrines in his production.
During the vacation, four volumes of
railroad law were added to our very excellent library, as well as the latest editions of a number of the differentstate reports.
The different organizations in the law
school are having their pictures taken for
the Microcosm, the college annual.
The following officers have been chosen
by the Junior class, for practical work in
the practice recitations:
Judge-Holcomb.
Prothonotary-W. B. Yeager.
Register of Wills-A. W. Mitchell.
Clerk of Court-Valentine.
District Attorney-Rothermel.
The college Glee Club and Orchestra has
been organized for the present year, with
the following members from the law
school.
In the Glee Club, second base, Hare and
Weeks; first base, Mitchell.
In the Orchestra, violin, Devall; flute,
Weeks. Mr. Hare is also manager of the
organization. Arrangements have been
made for an extended Easter trip, and
numerous other one night dates.
Devall, Rothermel, Taylor and Hess, are
members of the college basket-ball team.
At a meeting of the Middle class, held
Jan. 24th, the resign ation of Eugene Seigrist
as class historian was accepted, and Miss
Radle was elected to fill the position thus
made vacant.
The Senior class is receiving a very instructive course of lectures on patents and
patent law, this term, from Professor
Woodward. These lectures are an innovation in the course, never having been
introduced before. At the close of the
course of lectures, the study of the recent
bankruptcy law will be taken up.

THE FORUM.

THE ALUMNI.
8ylvester B. Sadler, of the Class of '98,
has been appointed by the Board of Poor
Directors of Cumberland county, attorney
to that board. Mr. Sadler was chosen from
among several applicants, all prominent
attorneys of the Cumberland County Bar,
among them, being the incumbent of last
year, making his success particularly gratifying. He is to be congratulated upon his
good fortune, and will without doubt, fill
the position with much credit to himself,
and satisfaction to the gentlemen who
selected him.
J. H. Curran, '96 Law, is taking a postgraduate course in Law and Economics at
Halle, Germany.
Edmund L. Ryan, of the class of '97, was
married recently, in Kane, to Miss Hicks,
one of the school teachers of that city.
.X*

Paul J. Schmidt, '98, has also forsaken
the ranks of single blessedness, and entered
into those of the Benedicts. He was married a few weeks since. Mr. Schmidt
has been admitted to the Luzerne County
Bar.
Mr. Robert A. Henderson, has been appointed one of the Examining Board of
Altoona. Mr. Henderson has gained considerable prominence by reason of his reiarkable defense in the "Boneka murder
trial," in Altoona.
S. E. Morrow, '96, Altoona, has moved
his offices into the Christy block, where he
now has very commodious apartments.
Mr. Greer Snyder, '97, paid a short visit
to Carlisle last week.
Harvey J. Line, '98, has fitted up very
pleasant quarters in the Kramer block.
He recently purchased a very beautiful and
complete office desk.
. A. J. Feight, '97, has rented desk room
in the offices of Mr. Line, so that he now
has two offices, one in Carlisle, and the
other in New Cumberland.

Wm. K. Shissler, '98, has been admitted
to the Schuylkill County Bar, after passing a very creditable examination.
Benedict, '97, and Chas. Daniels, '98,
and Capwell, '98, have been admitted to
the Lackawanna County Bar.
Slialter, '98, has received his discharge
from the army. He was a member of Co.
G, Eighth Regiment, and enlisted at 11t.
Gretna, last spring.
Mr. Chas. Greer, '93, after meeting with
pretty stiff opposition from a strong rival
for the position, was elected city solicitor
of Johnstown, by the council of that city.
Thos. K. Leidy, '97, has been elected
secretary of the Reading Bar Association.
F. T. Morrow, '98, has been admitted to
the Blair Co. Bar. He intends opening
an office in Tyrone, where he will "await
business."
Harry M. Persing, '97, has located at
Bear Gap, Pa.
R. N. Capwell, '98, is to be found in
Scranton, where he has opened an office.
Lieut. Hugh R. Miller, '98, of the 10th
U. S. Infantry, held a very prominent
position at the evacuation of Havana, on
New Year's Day. The 8th and 10th Regiments were the ones appointed for guard
duty in the city, and the batallion to
which he is at present attached was
chosen for guard duty in the court yard of
the palace, during the memorable ceremonies, when Spain's flag was lowered
from the battlements and replaced by the
Stars and Stripes.
John W. Kephart, '94, is meeting with
very gratifying success in Johnstown.
David J. Glennon, '96, is building up a
good practice in Pittston, at which place
be has his office.
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Francis J. Weakley, '95, has removed
from Reynoldsville, where he had been
practicing, to Carlisle, and has opened an
office with his father.

77

MOOT COURT
JOHN SNOW vs. FRANK SMITH.
Action in Assumpsit on PromissoryNote.

Fred. B. Moser, '98, of Shamokin, was
in town during the past month, attending
to some legal business.

Ralph G. Light, '98, has entered into a
law partnership with his father, an attorney of the Lebanon, Pa., bar.

Philip E. Radle, '98, who was admitted
to the Northumberland County Bar last
December, has purchased a valuable and
complete library, and is at present located
at Shamokin, in partnership with John
E. Small, of the class of'97.

DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The opening meeting of the society for
the winter term was held Jan. 13th, with
Pres. Sheeline in the chair. The program
of the evening consisted of a debate:
Resolved, "That the United States
should enter into an alliance offensive and
defensive with England. The speakers
for the affirmative were Messrs. MacEwen
and Collins, for the Negative, Messrs.
Hubler and Winlack. For judges, the society was very fortunate in securing the
services of Profs. Weakley and Woodward
and Air. Flannigan, who after listening to
the clear, forcible and convincing arguments of the disputants, rendered a unanimous decision in favor of the -negative.
The chair appointed Prof. Woodward as
critic for the evening and his courteous remarks were most kindly received.
This meeting was in no respects second
to any of the excellent meetings held during the fall term and we have no reason to
disbelieve the fact that if the quality of
work which is being done and interest
manifested in the same, continue, that the
outlook for the present term of the Dickinson Society is most encouraging.

SAMUEL HARE and FRED MILLER for
plaintiff
As against the makers of a note, no averment or proof of a demand of paymelit at
the place designated would be necessary.Wallace v. McConnel, 13 Peters 143. If
the maker has sustained any loss by the
omission of the holder to make such application for payment at the place designated, it is a matter of defense to be set up
by a plea and proof.-Foden & Slater v.
Sharp, 4 Johns 183; Wolcott v. Van Santboord, 17 Johns 248; U. S. Bank v. Smith,
11 Wheaton 172.
Where a bill or note is made payable at
a particular place it is not necessary that
the payee should aver presentation at that
place.-Carley v. Vance, 17 Mass. 388;
Meler v. New Orleans Bank, 5 Wharton
502; Fitler v. Beckley, 2 W. & S. 458.
WILLIAM A. JORDON and HARRY HUBLER for defendant.
If a promissory note be made payable at
a particular place, demand must be made
at that place, because it is made part and
parcel of the contract.-If maker is ready
to pay at time and place, he may plead it,
as he would plead a tender in bar of
damages and costs, by bringing money
into Court.-Fitler v. Beckley, 2 W. &
S. 462; Rahm v. Phila. Bank, 1 Rawle
335; Jenks v. Doylestown Bank, 4 W. &
S. 505.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Frank Smith on Dec. 1, 1898, gave a
note to John Snow for three hundred dollars, payable in one year from date at the
Merchant's Bank, Carlisle, Pa. Upon the
day the note became due Snow, meeting
Smith on the street, asked him for payment. Smith replied: "I have not that
amount of money with me and would like
to have you wait two or three days."
Three days afterwards Snow again met
Smith, who was intoxicated, and asked
him for the money. Smith answered: "I
wish you would attend to your own affairs; I have no time to talk to you."
Snow now brings the present action for
the face of the note and interest to date
although he has never presented it at the
bank for payment. Smith had sufficient
funds in the bank, when the note became
due, and until the present action, to pay
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it, and had instructed the bank officials to
pay the amount to Snow at any time it
was presented, after becoming due and
payable.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Smith note was payable, in one year
from its date at the Merchants' Bank, Carlisle. It was the legal duty of Smith to
have in the bank, on Dec. 1, 1897, enough
money to pay the note. Snow, its holder,
might have presented it to the bank, and
the terms of the note would have been as
much authority to it, to pay its amount to
Snow, as would a check payable to his order, drawn by Smith. But, besides the
language on the note, thebank had the oral
direction of Smith 'to pay the amount to
Snow at any time it was presented, after
becoming due and payable." It cannot be
doubted that the more regular conduct of
Snow would have been, to present the note
at the bank and demand payment of it.
Had such payment been refused, Snow
could clearly have sued Smith.
We do not need to consider what would
have been the result, had Smith made a
special deposit to meet the note. Probably,
in that case, the deposit would have become
the money of Snow. The risks attending
its safety wonld have been Snow's. Had
it been taken by robbery of the bank, or
had the bank become insolvent, the loss
would have been his. Fitler v. Beckley,
2 W. & S. 458 (dictum). The money was
not so far as appears. deposited to the account of the note. Smith retained control
of it. It had not become the property of
Snow. If it had, then no action could be
maintained against Smith on the note. He
must have sued the bank for the money, or
Smith for money received belonging to
him, Snow.
If the indication of the Merchants' Bank
as the place of payment were to be considered as making presentment there the condition precedent to the right to sue, unless
it were waived by Smith, by his failing to
have the money in the bank or otherwise,
the conclusion would be inevitable that
this action has been prematurely brought.
The money was in the bank when the note
became payable, and, so far as appears, has
there continued ever since. No demand
for )ayment has ever been made at or upon the bank. But, are we to treat the ref-

erence to the bank in the note, as the propounding of a condition of the right to sue?
We think not. "In the United States,"
says Daniel, 1 Negot. Inst. section 643, "it
may be considered as settled, that where a
note is made payable at a particular banker's or other place, or a bill is drawn or accepted payable in like manner, it is not
necessary,in respect to the maker or acceptor, to aver or prove presentment or demand
of payment at such place on the day the
instrument became due or afterward, in
order to maintain an action against him.
The only consequence of neglect of the
holder to present, as said by President
Tucker, in a Va. case, is, 'that the maker,'
if he was ready at the time and place to
make the payment, may plead the matter
in bar of damages and costs; but he must,
at the same time, bring the money into
court, which the plaintiff will be entitled
to receive. A further consequence, indeed,
might follow, if any loss had been sustained
by his failure to present; but this must be
set up as matter of defence." Cf. Fitler v.
Beckley, 2 W. & S. 458; Middleton v. Boston Locomotive Works, 26 Pa. 2.57. We
think Snow can recover the three hundred
dollars. :M-v be recover the interest?
The money was actually in bank, and
could have been had by Snow, had he presented his note there for payment. If
without previous demand on Smith, he
had brought this action, Smith could for
this reason have resisted the demand for
interest. If after bringing the action,
Smith had brought the money from the
bank into court, he would have prevented
the recovery of any interest whatever. As
in the case supposed, the suit would have
been the only notice of Snow's intention
to compel.the payment to him elsewhere
than at and by the bank, it would be inequitable to compel him to pay interest on
a sum of money which had been purposely left tt the bank, in order to pay, according to its terais, the note in suit.
But, on the day on which the note became due Snow met Smith on the street
and demanded paymnent. This was a
sufficient notice to him that Snow was not
going to the bank in order to obtain it.
Smith's reply did not remind him that
the money was in bank
It excused him
from immediate payment, because he had
not $300 with him, and begged for two or
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three day's delay. Too much importance
must not be attributed to the second interview, in which Smith declined to talk
with Snow. We think that the first conversation clearly apprised Smith that Snow
was expecting a payment elsewhere than
at the bank, and that it became his duty,
as it is ordinarily the duty of a debtor, to
seek his creditor Snow, and pay Snow. It
must be remembered that it does not appear that Smith's deposit was kept in the
bank for the purpose merely of meeting the
note, or that Snow had any reason to
think that it was so kept, after the firstinterview.
Had Snow had no interview with Smith
before the suit, Smith would have escape'A
interest, at least for the period preceding
the action. He would have escaped it for
the period following the institution of the
suit, had he brought the money into court.
The presence of the money at the bank
would have been equivalent to a tender.Titler v. Beckley, 2 W. & S. 458; 1 Daniel
Negot. Inst. supra. But the money has
not been brought into court. The bringing of the action was distinct notice to
Smith that he need no longer keep his
money at the bank. He is to be presumed
to have used it since then, for his own purposes. He would be liable fr interest since
that time, if he were not liable for precedent interest.
What we have said concerning interest,
will apply to costs. If Snow had not previously notified Smith that he would expect him to pay the note anywhere, he
would have brought suit subject to the risk
of having the costs put on him, if Smith
should bring the m~oney into court. The
nioney was not thus brought into court.
But Snow had demanded payment elsewhere than at the bank, before he brought
the suit, and had thus made it Smith's
duty to pay him without call at the bank.
The action was made necessary by his
neglect thus to pay. Snow then is entitled both to the costs and the interest.
As the case was tried below in accordance with these principles, the judgment
is affirmed.

JOHN HOPE vs. WM. FEAR.
Conspiracy-Effectof Forged Mfortgage on
Title-Damage Therefor.
WEEKS and SMrITH for plaintiff.
The gist of civil action for damage is
simply the injury done to plaintiff and if
injury is proven, plaintiff can recover.
-Wellington
v. Small, 3 Cushing 145;
Tilman v. Ryan et at, 168 Pa. 484.
Fair preponderance of evidence sufficient to show damages.-U. S. Trust Conpany v. O'Brien, 143 N. Y. 284; Allison v.
Chandler, 11 Mich. 542.
SIEGRIST and JORDAN for defendant.
Plaintiff has suffered no damages, in
contemplation of the law. Hutchins v.
Hutchins, 7 Hill 104; Jones v. Baker, 7
Cowen, 445.
At most the plaintiff is entitled to no
more than nominal damages-McCafferty
v. Griswold, 99 Pa. 270; Hummershotz v.
Gallagher, 23 W. N. C. 280; Thompson v.
Shepler, 22 P. F. S. 160.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Hope owned In fee, a lot in the Borough
of Carlisle. Thomas James and Fear conspired for the purpose of annoying and
injuring Hope, that James (pretending
that he had obtained a deed from Hope
for the premises, which had been lost and
whose former existence should be proved
by suborned witnesses X and Y) should
That Fear
make a mortgage of it to Fea.
should bring suit thereon; that James
should confess judgment and that a
sheriff's sale should be had. James and
Fear knew that Hope was about concluding an advantageous sale of the premises
for $8,000 whereas they were in fact worth
only $5,000 and the scheme was adopted
to defeat the sale. The proceedings on the
mortgage becoming known to Hope's
vendee he refused to complete the sale.
This is a trespass to recover $3,000 from
Fear.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The points of the defendant suggest two
objections to the plaintiff's recovery. The
first is, that James, the co-conspirator
with Fear, has not been joined with him
as a defendant. The second is that the
plaintiff has suffered no legal damages.
The declaration alleges that James mortgaged Hope's land to Fear, that Fear obtained by confession from James, a judgment on the mortgage, and issued a levari
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facies thereupon. These steps were taken
in consequence of a conspiracy between
James and Fear, the object of which was
to prevent Hope's completing a sale of the
land which he had in. view. Had James
and Fear been united as defendants, there
could have been a recovery against one,
though none was had against the other, if
acts of Fear had been proved, and the
motive with which he -is alleged to have
done them. He accepted a mortgage from
James. He knew that James had no
right to the land. He caused an execution
to be issued upon it. His object was to
defeat a negotiation between Hope and
another. Proof of the conspiracy would
have been unnecessary. Hence, a recovery
against Fear alone, would have been possible ; Laverty v. Vauarsdale, 65 Pa. 283;
Cooley, Torts, 145; Rundell v. Kalbfus,
125 Pa. 123; Collins v. Cronin, 117 Pa. 35.
But had it been necessary to show the
combination, so that no recovery against
Fear would have been possible without it,
it would not follow that Fear might not
have been sued alone for it. A joint tort
is not to be assimilated to a joint contract.
There is no right of contribution between
tort-feasors, as there is between co-contracting parties. The action is properly
brought against Fear alone.
But has Fear inflicted any wrong upon
Hope? Hope was about to conclude a
sale for $8,000 of his land which was
worth $5,000. The act of Fear was done
purely in order to defeat, and it did defeat
this sale. Hope, it is true, had no right
as against the person who was thinking of
buying, to the completion of thesale. He
had made no contract. Of his proposal to
sell, he was expecting the acceptance, but
it had not been accepted. Had the buyer
disappointed him, he would have been
remediless. He then had no legal right to
get $8,000, for his land. But does it follow that he had no legal right that there
should be no malicious interference with
his probable conclusion of the contract?
The right whose infringement he asserts,
is not a right that the purchaser shall
do something, but the right that Fear
shall not induce the purchaser, by the
means disclosed, to refrain from doing it.
Actions for slander of title, are founded
on the damage arising from the impediment to sale of the thing the title to

which is thus impugned.-Cooley, Torts
260. If a meditated sale is made impossible, by a malicious report that the thing
itself, e. g., land, is of inferior value, Paull
v. Halferty, 63 Pa. 46; or that the vendor's
title is defective, damages may be recovered. So, if one is prevented from being
employed by malicious representations, as
a teacher, he may obtain damages; Laverty v. Vanarsdale, 65 Pa. 507; Vanarsdale
v. Laverty, 69 Pa. 103. A third person's
depriving an expecting seller, Benton v.
Pratt, 2 Wend. 385; or buyer Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82, of his bargain, is actionable. Cf. Gore v. Condon, 40 L. R. A.
382, (Md.)
It is supposed that the fact that the contract of sale had not been concluded, precludes a recovery. It was precisely because
it had not been concluded, that a recovery
was permitted, in Paull v. Halferty, 63 Pa.
46, where it .is intimated, that, had there
been a contract, the vendor's remedy
would have been exclusively upon it and
against the vendee.
The plaintiff demands as damages the
difference between $5000, the normal and
constant value of the land, and $8000, the
price which he expected to get for it. He
was not certainly deprived of $3000, but
only of the chance of getting it. That
chance would not have sold for $3000. We
think however, that, as the defendant
maliciously intervened for the purpose of
preventing the expected stle, the jury
need not speculate as to how much that
chance was worth but may award such
damages as shall seem compensatory up to,
but not exceeding $3000. The .points of
the defendant are therefore refused.
THOMAS PARKER vs. DICKINSON
COLLEGE.
Injury Arising from Stepping in Depres,%on- Neqigencc of cor.-Negligence
of Plaintiff- Trespass.
LEvENs and KERNS for plaintiff.
Plaintiff was a bare licensee, and defendant is liable in damages for negligence
in not. keeping pathway in good condition.-Toomey v. Sanborn, 146 Mass. 28;
Bush v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 209.
MYERS and FRONTZ for defendant.
An individual is under no obligation to
licensee for any damages sustained by
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performance of that act.-10 Allen 385;
147 Mass. 136.
If plaintiff's negligence contributed in
any degree to the injury, however slight,
he cannot recover. -147 Pa. 122; 140 Pa. 620.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff offers to show that he was
injured while crossing the paths of the defendant corporation in the daytime, by
stepping into a depression caused by the
recent rains. This is to be followed by
proof that it has been the custom of the
public at large to so use these paths, with
the knowledge of the college authorities.
The defendant objects to the offer on the
ground that even if these facts be shown,
it would not establish the right of Parker
to a recovery -in damages for the injury
sustained.
The authorities are uniform in holding
that no liability for negligence will arise,
where a person comes upon the property
of another without invitation, though the
owner passively acquiesces, since he is a
mere licensee. Cusick v. Adams, 115 N.
Y. 55. On this principle it has been held
that the failure to prohibitpassage over an
eight-foot strip of land between two
houses, which have no other direct passage between them, does not constitute invitation sufficient to charge the owner
with liability for injuries to a person going
thereon, and falling into an excavation.Reardon v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267; R.
R. v. Wheeler, 29 L. R. A. 825.
But even should it be held that the
owner be liable to the licensee, yet if the
plaintiff's want of common care and prudence is the cause of the injury, no recovery can be had. Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48
Vt. 127. That Parker was guilty of such
contributory negligence as would preclude
a recovery by him in stepping into the depression in the daytime cannot be questioned, Stackhouse v. Vendig, 166 Pa. 582,
for it has frequently been held that a
licensee must avoid at his peril a hole,
though it be concealed by darkness.
Reardon v. Thompson, sitpra; Files v. R.
R., 149 Mass. 204.
We cannot therefore but conclude that
the objection should be sustained, and the
offer of the proposed testimony refused.

WM. BLOSER vs. CUMBERLAND
WATER CO.
Negligence- Water Company' sLiabilityQuestionfor Jury.
Motion to set aside non-suit.
SHAFFER and RILEY for plaintiff.
Negligence to be decided by jury.-101
Pa. 34A, Born v. Allegheny & Perrysville
Road Co. 13 Pa. 292 Fisher v. Monoligahela Ry. ,o.
Water Co. did not exercise ordinary care
to prevent water from being polluted.-67
Pa. 315, Westchester & P. R. R. Co. v. McElwee.
MARTIN and LIGHT for Defendant.

Negligence is question for court where
there is no contradictory evidence or facts
are admitted. This a question of law.Field on damages, page 519.
When evidence is insufficient to show
negligence it should not be submitted to
the jury.-87 Pa. 234, Syllabus.
STATEIENT OF THE OASE.

The Cumberland Water Company is a
corporation chartered for the purpose of
giving pure water to the citizens of Mt.
Holly. The water is taken from a stream
in the South Mountain two miles above
Mt. Holly. One mile above is a row of
tenement houses. Several of the families
living therein become afflicted with typhoid fever. Without the knowledge of
the company the sewage from these
houses empties into the stream, and affects
it. The disease germs are carried in the
water to the borough, where the company
distributes it. to its customers. The wife
of William Bloser is seized with this disease and dies from it. The physicians tes
tify that the water was the cause. Evidence is introduced to show that Bloser
suffers damage to the extent of $5000.
The court enters a compulsory non-suit,
on the ground that no liability of the company is shown.
Plaintiff moves to take off non-suit.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is the duty of a water company not to
furnish chemically pure water, (for that
w-ould be impossible, Commonwealth v.
TowandaWater Works, 22 W. N. C. 429),
but to furnish water which so far as
proper care can secure, shall be wholesome.
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It does not guarantee the wholesomeness
of the water. It would not be actionable,
simply because the water which it supplied a customer, was in fact unwholesome and caused him to be sick. It would
be necessary in order to recover from it, to
convict it of negligence. Buckingham v.
Plymouth Water Co. 142 Pa. 221.
A hon-suit was entered at the trial, because it was believed that the plaintiff's
evidence would not justify the inference
of negligence by the jury. Generally, the
jury must decide whether there has been
negligence, but with respectto negligence,
as to all other gravamina, the court nmust
refuse to submit the question, unless there
is enough evidence to support a finding by
sensible men.
Near the stream whence the defendant
obtained its water, and one mile above
the intake, there is a row of tenement
houses. Several of the families living
therein, were afflicted with typhoid fever.
In suffering the houses to be there, there
was surely no negligence in the company.
It had no means of preventing them, but
that of buying the land. That it was not
bound to do. Nor could it be responsible
for the typhoid fever. But the sewage of
the fever houses emptied, without its
knowledge into the stream. Did this imply negligence? Had it known this fact,
it would have been negligent, doubtless, if
it took no steps to prevent the pollution of
the water, or, at least, to warn its custonmers
thereof. But it did not know. How long
had the sewage been flowing into the
stream? Possibly it would be the duty of
the Company to inspect the banks of the
stream, in order to see whether improper
matter was being drained into it, and of
what it would have discovered, had it
thus inspected, it would be said to have
constructive notice. Born v. Allegheny
etc., Plank Road Co., 101 Pa. 334; Bier v.
Standard Manuf. Co., 130 Pa. 446. But
the plaintiff has not offered to show for
how long a time the sewage had been running into the rivulet, or that the jury
could infer that it was remiss in not making a proper inspection. The dejecta of
the typhoid patients may have been
poured into the stream between two inspections, or so recently before the pollution of the water which caused the death
of the plaintift's wife, that reasonable care

could not have discovered it in time to
prevent the contamination, or avoid the
consequences of it.
If the existence of typhoid fever in the
houses would put on the Company a duty
of stricter diligence in examining the
banks, it was not bound to know that the
fever existed, unless it was expressely informed thereof, or unless the fever had existed so long that the examinations which
it ought to have made, would have informed it. But no evidence has been
given of the duration of the sickness. The
company did not know of it, and was not
negligent in not knowing of it. We are
therefore unable to see how, without error,
the court could have refused to non-suit
the plaintiff, or give a binding instruction
to thejury to find for time defendant, 7f.
Buckingham v. Plymouth Water Co., 142
Pa. 221.
The rule to take off the non-suit is therefore discharged.

JAMES WALTERS vs. SAMUEL
BROWN.
Compulsory non-suit-Negligence---Trespass.
STOUFFER and TAYLOR for plaintiff.
Persons with poor eyesight should exercise extraordinary care in walking along
a public highway. 83 Mass. 177.
Plaintiff contributed negligence, hence,
cannot recover. 120 Pa. 306; 42 Pa. 499;
122 Pa. 463.
HENDERSON and PIPER for defendant.

When servant acts without reference to
work of his 'employer, but on an independent purpose of his own, master is not
liable for injurious results of such acts.
Mott v. Consumers Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 547;
Howe v. Newmarsh, 12 Allen 49.
Persons with defective eyesight must
use extraordinary precaution to avoid injury. Central R. R. Co., of N. J., vs.
Filler et. al., 84 Pa. 226; Wrine and Wife
vs. City of Lowell, 1 Allen 177.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Samuel Brown is a coal dealer in. the borough of Carlisle who delivers fuel to his
customers from a cart from which an iron
piece projects on whichithe coal passes from
the cart to the openings in the cellars across
the pavements.
On Oct. 1st, 1897, he sent an employee,
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Peter Henry, with a load of coal to the
house of Aaron Carter. The driver backed
the cart to the pavement, the iron piece
was run from the cart to the opening in the
cellar. The coal was discharged, but owing to some excitement in the street, the
cause of which Peter Henry desired to investigate, he abandoned his cart for a few
moments leaving the iron piece across the
pavement. James Walters at that time
passing along said pavement, being defective of eye sight, stumbled over the piece
and broke his limb, as a result of which
Walters was confi ned to his house and suffered damages to the extent of $100.00.
If under the law as applied to these facts
the ptaintiff is entitled to recover, we find
for him for $100.00, otherwise for the defendant.
Motion to take off the non-suit.
This is a motion by the plantiff to take
off compulsory non-suit entered by the
Court upon the trial of the case At that
time it was proved that James Walters
was injured by reason of falling over an
iron piece attached to a coal cart of the defendant, and which was being used at the
time by an employee, Peter Henry, to
convey coal from the cart to an opening
in the house of Aaron Carter. While
Henry was absent from the wagon investigating an excitement on the street,
tile plaintiff, a man of defective eyesight,
fell over the obstruction and was injured,
and this action was brought to recover
damages for the injury sustained.
An examination of the facts in this case
leads us to the conclusion that Henry was
negligent, and that Walters must answer
for his wrong-doing. Under similar circumstances the courts have so held.Whitely v. Pepper, 2 L. R. Q. B. 276.
It is contended, however, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence,
and hence is not entitled to a recovery.
This is based on the belief that it is negligence per se for those who are blind, or of
defective eyesight, to pass upon the streets
without companions to care for them.
After a careful examination of the authorities we think this contention is erroneous.
As one court has said, the streets are for
tie benefit of all conditions of people at all
times, and the mere fact that a blind man
walks the streets alone, and falls into an
excavation on the pavement, is not con-

elusive evidence of his negligence.-Town
of Salem v. Goller, 76 Ind. 291. But in
such case the plaintiff should exercise
greater care in walking on the street and
avoiding obstructions, than is required of
one of good sight, and the court should so
instruct the jury. Here a girl of defective
eyesight tripped over a plank on the pavement.-Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen 177.
The Courts have uniformly held that
where a blind man walks on the pavement and falls into an excavation, the
question of his contributory negligence is
for the jury. Smith v. Wildes, 149 Mass.
556; Sleeper v. Sandown, 52 N. H. 544;
Davenport v. Ruckman, et. al., 87 N. Y.
568; Peach v. Utica, 10 Hun. (N. Y.) 477.
And the court is not justified in saying
as a matter of law that such is the case,
but must submit the question to the jury
to say whether or not sufficient care was
exercised. Harris v. Uebelhoer, 75 N. Y.
169.
We think therefore that an error wias
committed in granting the compulsory
non-suit, and the motion of the plaintiff
to take the same, is hereby granted.

MARY STAR vs. FREDERIC MEANS.
Lessor's liability- Breach of leisor's
Agreement-Admissibility of parol eiidence when contracti9 in writing.
Appeal.
HOLCOMB and WINLACK for plaintiff.
Plaintiff in this case is a stranger to
landlord.-Rapp & Lawrence Law Dictionary.
Landlord is liable to third parties for injuries if a nusiance existed on the premises at the time of the demise.-1l5 N. Y.
203, James Ahern v. Rosalie M. Steele; 20
Pa. 387, Godly v. Hagerty; 57 N. Y. 567,
Theresa Mullen v. §anmuel R. St. John;
138 Mass. 480, Cunningham v. Cambridge
Savings Bank.
JoHNsToN and VALENTINE for defendant.
Means, the lessor, is not liable for injuries
sustained by plaintiff unless he had contracted to repair.-7 N. Y. 805, Sterger v.
VanSiclen.
The lease being in writing, parol evidence cannot be given. -89 Pa. 131, Wilgus v. Whitehead.
Defendant having no contract with
plaintiff is not liable for damages suffered.
4 Cushing 277, Lowell v. Spaulding.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Tritt leased from the defendant a
house to be used as a boarding house. Before the lease was signed the agent of the
owner, Means, orally agreed that he
would put the house in a "tenantable and
safe condition." The contract was drawn
up one week later, and no mention was
made therein of any such condition. Tie
house was used for boarding purposes, and
the plaintiff in this case became a lodger
with Tritt. By reason of a defect in the
roof of which the defendant was aware, it
fell and injured the plaintiff for life. This
action was brought for $5000 damages suffered.
At the trial of the cause the lower court
instructed the juryFirst, That they must not consider the
evidence as to an agreement to make the
house safe, such a condition not appearing
in the lease which was the written agreement between the parties.
Second, That the plaintiff in this case
being a boarder of Tritt, must look to him
alone for any damage done.
The Supreme Court is asked to reverse
on the ground of erroneous instructions
to the jury.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

A week before the lease to Tritt, the
agent of Means promised him the premises.should be put in a "tenantable and
safe condition." The trial court told the
jury not to consider the evidence of this
promise, because it was not incorporated
into the lease. The old rule concerning
the modification of written contracts by
means of parol has been seriously impaired
in Pennsylvania. At present, in order
to admit the oral stipulations in evidence,
it is not necessary that they should have
been omitted by accident or mistake, or
that their omission should have been due
to a fraudulent purpose existing at the
time of the execution of the writing. Ferguson v. Rafferty, 128 Pa. 337. It is
enough if the parol stipulation induced
the party to whom it was made to accept
the written contract. In order thus to induce, it is not necessary that the oral
promise should be made at the very hour
of making the writing. It may have been
made before, and remembered, may in-

fluence the decision of the promisee. We
cannot approve the reason, therefore, for
which the court of common pleas advised
the jury to disregard the evidence of the
promise to repair the building.
But the action by Mary Star is not upon
the contract to repair. She was not a
party to it. She cannot recover because
of the breach of it. Her action is not contractual. If it has any foundation at all
it reposes on a tort wholly disconnected
with a contract. We see therefore no relevancy in the oral promise to repair the
building and put it in "safe condition,"
except as it is shows that the unsafeness
of the roof was known to the principal.
There was other evidence of this knowledge, and the exclusion from the consideration of the jury of the oral promise may
have worked no. harm. We think itmigbt
properly have been weighed by the jury,
in conjunction with the other evidence,
upon the point of the knowledge of the
landlord.
The court likewise instructed the jury
that Mary Star could not recover, because
she was a mere boarder in Tritt's house
If the action was founded on contract,
this would doubtless be true. The plaintiff was not a party to any contract, and
Means undertook, by contract, no duties
towards her. Had the contract said nothing on the subject of safety, it would still
have been the duty of Means to avoid any
injury to Tritt, that might arise in consequence of a dangerous defect of the
premises, of which Means was aware, and
of which Tritt was ignorant. Hines v.
Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148; 34 L. R. A. 824.
The house was used as a boarding-house,
one of the purposes to which the landlord
was bound to know it might be put.
Means therefore owed a similar duty to
any of the persons who became boarders.
Stenberg v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 163; 34 L.
R. A. 615. When A leased a building to
B, knowing that B was going to use it for
a store house, and it was so weak as to be
unfitted for this use, he was liable to C, a
workman, who was hurt, by the collapse
of the building; Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa.
387; and to D, the owner of goods that
were destroyed, Carson v. Godley, 2.6 Pa.
111. In the former of these cases, Woodward, J., says, "We care not how distinctly it is understood that, when a man
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erects a building to rent, the law requires of her husband's note. She had the capaa reasonable share of that regard for hu- city to make a contract to pay the prebut she had no capacity to make
man life which he is sure to manifest mium,
the particular instrument which is sought
when he builds for his own inhabitance. to be enforced.. Wiltbank v. Tobler, 181
Pa. 103.
If he will build, as charged and found in
the case, "loosely, carelessly, unskilfully
OPINION OF COURT.
and negligently," and with "insufficient
Jan.
9th,
1897, Win. Amesand Henry
On
and improper materials" whereby the
endorsed
a note at 90 days for $237
Hooper
innocent and unsuspecting are injured,
let him respond in damages. Heis bound drawn by Amos Tritt, for his accomodato employ reasonable skill and diligence tion in order that he might have it disin the erection of his building, regard be- counted and with the money thus obing had to the uses and purposes for which tained pay the premium on a policy on his
life, payable to his wife, RebeccaTritt. To
it is designed."
It cannot matter Whether the lessor protect them as endorsers, Amos and Rehimself built the house or not. If he becca Tritt made, at the same time, a note
built it, he probably knows of its struc- at 90 days, with warrant of attorney, payable to Ames and looper, Rebecca, who
tural defects. But if, not having built it,
he in some other way, knows of these de- was anxious that the insurance should be
effected, advising and urging her husband
fects, his act of letting other people occupy
to borrow the money from the bank, and
it is equally reprehensible.
Judgment reversed, with venirefacias inducing Ames and Hooper to become his
security byjoining him in the note. A few
de novo.
AMES & HOOPER vs. REBECCA
TRITT.
A marriedwoman cannot become an accommodation indorser, maker, guarantdr or surety for another.
Action on a note.
FRED. MILLER and WALTER HAUCK

for plaintiff.
1. A married woman may execute a
promissory note. Act of June 3, 1887;
June 8, 1893; Mitchell v. Richmond, 164
Pa. 566; Evans v. Evans, 155 Pa. 572.
2. Upon the death of one of several
joint debtors or promisors, the liability aevolves upon the survivor. Hoskenson v.
Elliot, 62 Pa. 393; Serp v. Drach, 2 Harris
355.
3. Creditors cannot seize upon the life
insurance money for the debts of the husband.
Act of May 1, 1876. This life insurance
money is her individual property and is
liable for her debts.
4. Rebecca Tritt as a joint promissor is
liable for the whole debt, Clark on Contracts 355.
E. H. HOFFMAN and HERMAN M.
SYPHERD for defendant.
1. A married woman cannot become an
accommodation maker, guarantor, or
surety for another. Act of June 8, 1893,
P. & L. p. 344; Henry v. Begley, 5 Sp. Ct.
503; Weigle v. Leonard, 4 Sp. Ct. 434;
Moyer v. Capp, 15 C. C. 126.
2. The execution of the note by Rebecca Tritt was for the express purpose of
protecting Ames and Hooper as endorsers

days after the note matured, Amos Tritt
died insolvent. Rebecca's brother was appointed administrator, and, at an Orphans'
Court sale, her late husband's land was
bought by her. She has obtained $4000 on
the policy. Ames and Hooper, having,
under compulsion paid the bank, the administrator first told them that Rebecca
would pay the note to them. He since declares that she is not liable, and will not
pay it, and she has refused to pay it. She
asks the court to instruct the jury that, on
the facts proven, she is not liable.
The note oil which the suit is brought,
was jointly made by Amos and Rebecca
Tritt. He has died. At common law, the
liability survived. 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
193. Although, by statutes, the estate of
the deceased Amos is not discharged, Act
April l1th, 1848, 2 P. & L. 3397; Bowman's
Adm. v. Kistler, 33 Pa. 106 ; Brewster v.
Sterrett, 32 Pa. 115; its liability is not
to be enforced by a joint action against it
and the survivor. Tile survivor must, if
Hoskinson v.
sued, be sued severally.
Elliott, 62 Pa. 393. No error has been
committed, in suing Rebecca Tritt alone.
It is alleged, however, that she signed
the note simply as a surety or guarantor
for her husband. The 2nd section (if the
act of June 8th, 1893, 1 P. & L. 2890, while
bestowing on a married woman the power,
"in the same manner, and to the same ex-
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tent, as an unmarried person," to make
contracts, adds, "but she may not become
accommodation indorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another." Does the evidence show that Rebecca Tritt was a
surety?
It could not be inferred that she was,
simply because she was a co-maker with
another, of the note, nor, because her
name was below that of the other maker,
nor becauise the other maker was her husband.
None of these facts justifies an in ference
that the parties are other than co-principals. We are not left however to presumptions. We are shown by the evidence that
Amos Tritt wanted to borrow S237 from a
bank. To accomplish this, he made a note,
payable to Ames & Hooper, which they
endorsed. As to them, he was the princiBut, they declined to endorse for
pal.
him, until the note in suit was made by
him and his wife. Her assumption was
made in order to induce them to undertake for his repayment of the money to
the bank. As respects them, she clearly
became her husband's surety. Cf. Patrick
v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526; Wiltbank v. Tobler,
181 Pa. 103.
But, a deeper inspection of the evidence,
shows that the object of the husband was
to procure a benefit for the wife. He was
contemplating the buying of a policy of
insurance on his life for her, and the
noney he obtained from the bank, he intended to use, and did use, in paying the
original premium upon iti Thi.; circumstance, however, would not make his wife
the primary debtor, or a co-primar'y debtor.
He might have borrowed the money from
her for the purpose. Would he not have
been her debtor? Could he, contrary to
her intention, make her pay for what he
professed to intend as a gift? In Wiltbank
v. Tobler, 181 Pa. 103, the money procured
on the note signed by the husband and
endorsed by the wife, was procured to be
used in paying her debt. She was none
the less a surety for him. The form of the
transaction justified the inference that the
husband did not intend thereby to constitute himself a creditor of the wife. It is
not unusual for a husband to take out a
policy on his life, at his own expense, for
his wife, or to purchase for her, other
things of value, out of his own funds.

The mere fact that he had to get assistance
from her, in a loan of her credit, would
It
not alter the character of his act.
would still be a gift to her.
Rebecca was "anxious to obtain the inand urged"
surance," and "advised
Amos Tritt to borrow the money from the
bank, and was present at, the arrangement
with Ames and Hooper. Neither any nor
all of these facts show that Mrs. Tritt intended, or was understood by her husband
and the plaintiffs, as intending to become
the primary debtor. They are all consistent with her intention to urge and aid her
husband to make a gift to her of the
policy.
We affirm therefore, gentlemen of the
jury, the point of the defendant. Upon
the evidence you can do not otherwise
than find a verdict for her.

JAMES APES vs. SOLOMON SATTERLEE.
.flarriageof a Lunatic-Legztimacy-Intestate Law-Syllabus.
1. If a married woman subsequently
declared to have been insane at the time
of marriage, lives with her husband after
she has regained her mind and cohabits
with him for years and until her death
the marriage will be considered a legal
one.
2. A son born one year after lunacy of
wife is removed, is a legitimate child and
entitled to inherit from his mother.
3. An illegitimate child can inherit
from its mother.
HARRY C. HUBLERI for plaintiff.
1. The marriage of an insane woman
is void. True v. Ranney, 21 N. H 52;
Browning v. Reaver, 2 P. R. 70; Middleborough v. Rochester, 12 Mass. 363; A. &
E. Ency. Vol. 1, p. 141.
2. The issue of a void marriage is illegal
and cannot inherit.-Tifhny Dora. Rel.
226; Davis v. Houston, 2 Yeates 289;
Cooley v. Dewey, 4 Pick 93.

GEo. W. AUBREY and SATNIUEL B.

HARE

for defendant.
1. The subsequent cohabitation of
Adam Satterlee and Rebecca J. Satterlee
after the disability had been removed,
raises a presumption of common law marriage and may be conclusive where it is
sought to prove the legitimacy of issue.Tiffany Doa. Rel. 33; Strauss Estate, 168
Pa. 561-Richards Boshem, 73 Pa. 140.Nathans Case, 2 Brews. 149.
2. A lunatic on regaining his reason
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may affirm a marriage celebrated while he
is insane, by continued cohabitation.Am. & Eng. Ency.. Vol. 14, p. 491; Cole
v. Cole, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 57.
3. When the parents of an illegitimate
child enter into wedlock and cohabit
the issue is legitimate.-Act of May 14,
1857, P..& L. 507.
4. Solomon Satterlee being of the blood
of the ancestor, is entitled to inherit his
mother's real estate, descended from his
mother.-Act of Apr. 8, 1833, P. & L. 316.
5. Even if illegitimate he is entitled to
inherit.-Act. of Apr. 27, 1855.
STATE31ENT OF THE CASE.

Rebecca Jones married Adam Satterlee,
on the first Sunday of Oct., 1861, and lived
with him as wife until her death on Jan.
7,1898. Solomon Satterlee is their son,
born in 1865. At the time of the marriage
Rebecca was irresponsibly insane, and, on
proceeding in lunacy instituted a year
afterward, was found to have been so for
Two years
the four preceding years.
after the inquisition, she regained her
senses, and continued sane for the rest of
her life. At her death, the land which,
as heir of her mother, she had inherited,
descended to her son or to her mother's
brother, Apes, as heir. The son was
elearly the heir unless the insanity of his
mother prevented his being such.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The land, which is the subject of this
ejectment, had been the property of Rebecca Jones' mother. At her death, tills
with other land, had descended to her son
.Tames Apes and to his sister Rebecca. A
subsequent partition had vested the exclusive right to this land in Rebecca. At
the death of Rebecca, it descended either
to her'sou Solomon Satterlee, or to her
brother, James Apes.
Under the intestate law, Solomon Satterlee if a legitimate son would be the heir
of his mother, and not her brother. His
legitimacy is assailed, on account of the
mental condition of his mother, at the time
of her marriage. She was then "irresponsibly insane." An inquisition in lunacy
held a year afterwards, found that she had
been so, for the four preceding years. She
was therefore incapable of making any
contract, and in particular, the contract of
marriage. The ostensible marriage, was
therefore void. 14 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 490;
1 Bishop, M. & D. 103. It was void, in

the sense that it could be so declared, in
this collateral suit between the two claimants of her land. It was not void, in the
sense that it could not be validated by a
ratification after the recovery of sanity.
It could be thus ratified. 1 Bishop, Marriage &. D. 114; Wightman v. Wightman, 4
Johns Ch.343; 14 Arz. & Eng. Encyc. 491.
Note to Sims v. Sims, 40 L. R. A. 737.
Was it thus ratified?
In 1864, three years after the marriage,
Rebecca Satterlee recovered her sanity. She
continued, however, to live with Adam
Satterlee, as his wife, until her death, on
Jan. 7, 1898, a period of 34 years. No better evidence of her ratification is necessary.
In 1865 the son Solomon was born. She
l)resunlably knew that her husband claimed her as his wife, by virtue of the original
marriage. Her continued cohabitation
with him for over 30 years is an impressive evidence of her acquiescence in the
status which the contract had been intended, by the husband at least, to create.
But, were Solomon an illegitimate son,
he would be his mother's heir. The act
of April 27, 1865, 1 P. & L. 2420, declares
that illegitimate children and their mother
shall "have capacity to take or inherit
from each other personal estate, as. next of
kin, and real estate, as heirs in fee simple,
and, as respects said real or personal estate so taken, and inherited, to transmit
the same according to the intestate laws
of this state." Under this act, an illegitimate has exactly the same capacity to inherit from his mother, as a legitimate.
Opdyke's Appeal, 49 Pa. 373. He inherits
to the exclusion of all collaterals. James
Apes therefore, acquires no estate in the
premises, by the death of his sister.
Judgment will therefore be entered on
the case stated, in favor of the defendant.
FRANK MORRIS vs. ELLA MORRIS.
Interpretationof wills-Meaning of words
"childrenand issues"-Definite and indefinite issue.
Two exceptions to the auditor's report.
RUBY R. VALE and CHAS. H. ME YER

for plaintiff, citedIn the construction of the will in question, the intention of the testator as clearly
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seen in the.words children or grandchildren to mean definite issue and not an indefinite issue. Hughes v. Sayer, 1 Johnson 349; Bedford's Appeal, 40 Pa. 18.
The phrase "without children" is to be
regarded as descriptive of persons, and to
refer to a definite failure of issue. Guthrie's Appeal, 1 Wright 18; Moffat v.
Strong, 10 Johnson 16.
The devise over is to persons in error
designated. Morgan v. Morgan, 5 Day.
507; Diehl v. King, 6 S. & R. 31.
J. ICIRK BOSLER and M. WOLF for defendant, heldIf a bequest be made to a person absolute
in the 1st instance and it is provided that
in the event of death or death without issue, another legatee or legatees shall be
substituted to the share there given, it
shall be construed to mean death or death
without issue before testator's. Mackey's
Appeal, 92 Pa. .514; Shutt v. Rambo, 94
Pa. 141; Estate of Mary Biddle, 28 Pa. 59;
Estate of Jos. Mickley, 13 Phila. 281; Livingstone v. Green, 52 N. Y. 118.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Morris died in 1875, leaving a
will, which after making some bequests to
his wife provided as follows: "All the
remainder of my estate (which consists
entirely of personal property) I give and
bequeath to my three children, Frank,
Ella and Mary, to be equally divided
between them. But in case my son Frank
should die without leaving eitber children
or grandchildren, his share shall be paid
back (the principal only) and shall be
equally divided between my daughters,
Ellh and Mary or their heirs; but in case
my daughter Mary should die previous to
the death of my son Frank and leave
neither children nor grandchildren, the
share of my son Frank paid back as aforesaid shall be given to my daughter Ella or
And in case my daughter
her heirs.
Mary should die without leaving either
children or grandchildren her share (the
principal only) shall be paid back and to
be given to my daughter Ella or her heirs.
But it is my will that neither Frank nor
Mary aforesaid shall give security for refunding their said shares."
Mary died intestate in 1897, leaving an
estate of $5000. She never had any children. Frank and Ella are both living.
Ella before the Auditor claims the $1500
which Mary received from the estate of
her father.
The claim is resisted by
Frank.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

William Morris died in 1875, bequeathing
his personal estate to his three children,
Frank, Ella and Mary. Each of these
children received his third, shortly after
Morris' death. Twenty-two years thereafter, Mary has died, and her estate is
now undergoing distribution in the Orphans' Court. Ella Morris claims $1,500,
the amount Mary received from the father's
estate, on the ground that, Mary having
died, unmarried and without descendants,
the executory devise over, to Ella, contained in her father's will, has gone into
effect.
The gift to Mary was qualified by these.
words: "And in case my daughter Mary
should die without leaving either children
or grandchildren, her share (the principal
only) shall be paid back and be given to
my daughter Ella or her heirs. But it is
my will that neither Frank nor Mary
aforesaid, shall give security for refunding
their said shares."
Frank resists Ella's claim, on several
grounds. He alleges, (]) that the bequest
is absolute, despite the words just quoted.
A fee tail cannot be created in money. If
by the words quoted the testator had
meant an indefinite failure of the issue
of Mary, a failure of issue of any generation, however remote, the limitation
would have been nugatory. The bequest
to Mary would have been absolute. Amelia
Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. 9; 'Mengel's Appeal, 61 Pa. 248; Bentley v. Kauffman, 86
Pa. 99; Biddle's Appeal, 69 Pa. 190: Bedford's Appeal, 40 Pa. 18; Moyer's Appeal
160 Pa. 253.
In bequests of personalty, the courts
"have seized with avidity on any circumstance, however trivial, denoting an intent" on the testator's part, to make the
limitation over take effect at the death of
the legatee. Seibert v. Butz, 9 W. 494;
Miller's Estate, 145 Pa. 561. The word
used is not issue, but "children or grandchildren," presumably words of purchase.
Bedford's Appeal, 40 Pa. 18. Cf. Moyer's
Appeal, 160 Pa. 253. The money is to be
paid back to Ella or her heirs. The possibility of Ella's being alive, at the failure of
Mary's issue, is therefore contemplated.
It is hardly conceivable that the testator
intended that, if the money passed from
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Mary to her children, and these died without children, they should be liable to pay
it back to Ella. He could nothave had in
mind a payment back by any other than
Ella's administrator, at her death. Cf.
Miller's Estate, 145 Pa. 561; Gormley's Estate, 154 Pa. 378. That Ella was named as
the alternate legatee, is some indication
that the moment of the death of Mary was
the intended time of devolution. Deihl v.
King, 6 S. & R. 29; Rupp v. Rupp, 6 Pa.
45; Bedford's Appeal, 40 Pa. 18. We think
the will is to be understood as directing the
payment of 'the legacy to Mary back, at
the time of her death, if she should then
have left no issue to survive her.
2. But, Frank Morris contends, further,
that the testator had in mind, the death
of Mary before himself, and that that event
not having happened, since she survived
him for 22 years, the gift to her was absolute. Were there nothing in the will to
indicate that the death of Mary after that
of the testator was in contemplation,
Frank's contention would be unanswerable. Morrison v. Truby, 145 Pa. 540;
Mickley's Appeal, 92 Pa. 514; Cressler's
Estate, 161 Pa. 427; Mitchell v. Pittsburg,
etc.) R. R. Co., 165 Pa. 645; Jackson's Estale, 179 Pa. 77. But, are there not such
indications?
The will contemplates the necessity of
a repayment by Mary and Frank. " But
it is my will that neither Frank nor Mary
aforesaid, shall give security for refunding
their said shares." The share of Frank,
and that of Mary, are to be "paid back."
It is quite clear that in no event, was th6
legacy to be paid to Mary before her
father's death. And it is also clear that if
her death withoutchildren in the testator's
thought, was her death before his own, no
money would ever have been paid, so as to
be capable of being paid back, or refunded.
The provision for the payment back of
Frank's share is entirely inapplicable if
Frank's death before his father was intended. The conclusion is irresistible that
the testator designed, by the direction that
Mary's share should be paid back, that the
event on which it should be paid back,
should be her death after his, and after the
legacy had been paid to her. But for the
exemption of Mary by the clause of tile
will, from the duty of giving "security,"
it would have been error in the court

which distributed her father's estate, to
allow her to receive her legacy without
a refunding bond with security. Bedford's
Appeal, 40 Pa. 18. That clause allowed
her to receive tile custody of the fund
without such bond.
The auditor's report must be corrected
and the balance of the estate will be thus
distributed.
Balance for distribution,
Pay to Ella,

$5,000
1,500

$3,500
Of this, pay to Ella, as next kin,
$1,750
"
99
Frank, as next of kin, $1,700

HENRY G. FISHER vs. FRANK Y.
GERMAN.
BEmployer and Employ -Liabiliy of
Employer for negligence of employs.
Syllabus.
The result of an isolated act of negligence
of an employ6, upon a co-employ6, cannot be visited upon their common employer.
The master is responsible for a negligent
act of an employ6 if he was aware, prior to
it, of the employ 's proneness to do such
acts.
TMotion for a compulsory non-suit.
WENCEL HARTIAN, JR. and FRANK J.
LAUBENSTEIN for plaintiff.
It is the duty of the master to instruct
workmen of the dangers incident to their
employment. Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42;
Smith v. Oil City Ins. Co., 183 Pa. 485.
Defendants should be liable for not coniplying with the law, in having automatic
trap-doors on elevator shafts. ActofJune
8, 1893, 1 P. & L. 488.
CHAS. G. MOYER and FRANK B. SELLERS for defendant.
When the injuries for which an action
is brought by an employC against his employer were caused by the negligence of a
fellow-servant he cannot recover. Smith
on Mlaster & Servant, p. 220; Durst v. Carnegie Co., 173 Pa. 162.
Plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence and cannot recover. Wood on
Master and Servant, p. 456; Ingram v.
Lehigh Coal Co., 148 Pa. 177; Knisely v.
Corbin, 1:32 Pa. 341.
STATE'MENT OF THE CASE.
Frank Y. German is the proprietor of a
paper box factory. He personally employed
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in a floor, in consequence of which another
emnploy6 walking over the floor, was injured, was not chargeable upon the master.
The master is responsible for a negligent
act of an employ6 if lie was aware, prior
to it, of the employe's proneness to do such
acts. But, there is no evidence before us,
either that the day-hand was a negligent
person, or that, if he was, the master
should have known that he was.
It appears, from what we havesaid, that
we regard the day-hand and the night
watchman, as fellow servants. It would
not be profitable to debate the quesgion.
We are not aware that the plaintiff has at
all challenged the proposition, that they
are. German personally employed Fisher,
the watchman. A foreman employed, but
with the proprietor's consent, the dayhand. The difference in the mode of their
selection is entirely immaterial, as also is
OPINION OF THE COURT.
that in the nature of their duties.
This action is predicated on the negliWe fail to see any responsibility for the
act of the day-hand. But, that act, it is
gence of the defendant and on the freedom
of the plaintiff from all contributory neg- said, would not have resulted in the hurt
to Fisher, if a guard had been built around
ligence. 'The defendant asks for a conthe opening in the floor, and it is urged
pulsory non-suit, because neither of these
postulates is true. The defendant, he al- that the jury ought to be allowed to deterleges, has not been shown by the evidence
mine whether due care required the conto have been negligent while the plaintiff struction and maintenance of such a guard.
has, by it, been shown to have contributed
The legislature has dealt with the precaution to be adopted, with regard to elevator
to the accident by his negligence.
What proof is there of German's negli- holes. The 28th section of the act of June
gence? The immediate cause of the acci- 8, 1893, 1 P. & L, 488, requires that the
"openings through and upon each floor
dent, was the act of the day-hand, in opening the trap-door and so nailing it, that it
shall be provided with and protected by a
would not close. Gorman did not personsubstantial guard or gate, or with good
ally perform this act. Nor did he direct
and sufficient automatic trap-doors to close
the same." The guard or the trap-door is
or authorize it. The act, we shall assume,
was a negligent one. But, is it to be imdeemed sufficient. We are not persuaded
puted to German? The fact that the day- that, after German had furnished, in comhand was an employd, while it would
pliance with this act, the automatic trapmake his acts imputable to German, in so
doors, lie could with propriety be mulcted
in damages, for notsupplying, in addition,
f r as they affect third persons, does not
a guard or gate. No complaint is made of
cast responsibility on German, so far as
the imperfection of the trap-doors. They
fellow servants are concerned. Nothing is
"always closed," when the elevator had
better ascertained than that the result of
an isolated act of negligence of an empassed through. They would have closed
ploye, upon a co-em ploy6, cannot be visited
in this instance, but for the interference of
the day-hand.
Time person who is, reupon their comnion employer. Prevost v.
sponible for that interference, only, is we
Citizens' Ice Co., 185 Pa. 617; McGinley v.
Levering, 152 Pa. 366; Durst v. Steel Co.,
think liable in damages.
Fisher had been employed in the build173 Pa. 162; Kinney v. Corbin, 132 Pa. 341;
ing for a year and a half. He knew when
Allegheny Heating Co. v. Rohan, 118 Pa.
lie was approaching the trap-door. He
223. In Rawling v. Hoskins, 132 Pa. 617,
one employe's omission to close a trap-door
must have known that there was a possiHenry G. Fisher as a night watchman of
his factory,which position Fisher occupied
for a year and a half. There was in the
building an elevator used for the purpose
of carrying boxes, etc., from one floor to
another.
This elevator had automatic
trap-doors at the floors which always
closed when it had passed through. Last
September, one of the day-hands who was
employed by a foreman other than the
proprietor but with the proprietor's consent, opened the trap-doors on one of the
floors and nailed them so that they would
not close. Fisher always went through
the building without a lantern, and while
doing so on this particular night he fell
through the opening thus caused, and sustained very severe injuries. He sues for
$.5000 damages. The defendant asks for a
compulsory nou-suit.
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bility that the automatic movement would
fail to work, or that it might be impeded
by some act similar to that of the dayhand. We think that when he ventured,
without examination over the space, which
ought to be covered by the door, he took
all risks upon himself. It matters little,
whether such an act of hazard be deemed
negligent or not. He accepted the possible
consequences of it, and cannot impute
them to German, the employer.
The defendant has argued that Fisher's
venturing over the aperture without a
light is negligenceper se and can be so declared by the court. In Ingham v. Lehigh Coal Co., 148 Pa. 177, a night watchman, venturing into a place of danger, at
night without a light, in consequence of
which he fell into a hole in the floor, was
stigmatized as negligent. We do not feel
compelled to hold that Fisher's failure to
use a light or other means of investigation,
was negligent. Possibly it would not be,
and he might recover, in a suit against the
day-hand. As respects the employer German, we think he took the risk of the
proper action of the automatic machinery,
or of the fellow workmen. It i not necessary to go further, and to censure his act
as careless or reckless.
The non-suit must be granted.
HENRY PAXSON vs. HARRY
BENNER.
.Exceptions to finding of auditor in the
matter of distribution of the estate of
Samuel Paxson, deceased-Incompetency
of witness on ground. of interest-Interpretation of witness act of May V3, 1887.
Bill of exceptions.
WILLIAM MN.FLANIGAN and GEORGE
W. COLES for plaintiff submitted to court
the following reasons why the finding of
auditor should not be allowed to stand:
1st. That witness act of May 23, 1887,
clause (E) of 5th section-of this act does not
render Henry Paxson an incompetent witness. The text of an adverse interest,
where the right of a deceased party is concerned, is not simply whether the witness
may gain by the testimony, but whether
he will gain at the expense of decedent's
estate. That an adverse party may testify
against the 'estate of a deceased party if
the estate cannot lose thereby. 2 D. E.
854.

A. FRANK JOHN and W. B. FREED for
defendant in support of auditor's finding.
1. That Henry Paxson, being a )arty in
interest is not a competent witness. Act
of May 23, 1887; Parry v. Parry, 130 Pa 94;
Bell v. Farmers' Deposit Bank, 24 W. N.
C. 166; Crothers v. Crothers, 30 W. N. C.
293.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Samuel Paxson died leaving an estate
which consisted of a farm, which was sold
at an Orphans' Court sale forS6000. Harry
Benner loaned Paxson in his lifetime,
some money onl two judgment notes,
which are both liens of record. The one
represented by the first lien is for $1000,
and the second for $5500. The first note
was signed also by Paxson's son, Henry.
When the father died Henry was appointed administrator. Thinking to protect
himself he paid Benner the note, on which
his name appeared, and had it marked to
his use. An auditor of the estate having
been appointed, Henry offered himself as
witness to prove that he had signed the
note as surety simply.
His competency was objected to. The
auditor received the evidence, noted the
objection,'and in his report found that the
witness was incompetent to testify and allowed the amount of Benner's judgment,
$5500 in full.
Henry Paxson excepts to the finding,
and to the allowance of Benner's claim in
full.
OPINION QF THE COURT.

Two judgments encumbered the land
of Samuel Paxson, at his death, one for
$1000, which was also against Henry Paxson, Samuel's son, and another for $5500,
against Samuel alone. The plaintiff in
both of these judgments was Henry Benner. Samuel Paxson's land has been sold
by the Orphans' Court, and its proceeds,
$6000, are undergoing distribution. Henry
Paxson has paid the $1000judgment and
taken an assignment of it.

Prima.facieSanmuel and Henry Paxson
were co-principals, each liable as respects
the other, for one-half of the debt. When
Henry paid the judgment, taking an assignment of it, he acquired a right to payment on it, to the extent of $500, at least,
2 Trickett, Liens, 755. He insists however, that he was a surety for Samuel, his
father, and therefore that, on paying the
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judgment, he was subrogated to Benner's
right, for the purpose of obtaining re-payment in full. It is not to be doubted that,
on the assumed facts, he would have had
this right to subrogation, as against the
later judgment against Samuel Paxson, 2
Liens, 764. Henry Paxson paid Benner,
and Benner marked the judgment to his
use. If Benner had intended to dispute
Henry Paxson's right to wield the judgment, whether to secure the whole of it or
one-half only, he would have hardly done
this. He was made aware, by Henry's
application for the assignment, that Henry
intended to claim payment of the $1000,
and the act of making the whole judgment to his use, without qualification ,was
scarcely consistent with a purpose to challenge his right to receive the money from
the land.
Henry Paxson was prima facie a coprincipal. He alleges that he was in fact
a surety, and that he has a right to be
paid $1000 from the fund. He offers himself as a witness. At common law he
would have been incompetent on the
ground of interest. The 4th section of the
act of May 23rd, 1887, 2 P. & L. 4833, enacts that no interest, except as provided
in section 5, "shall make any person incompetent as a witness." The 5th section
retains the incompetency of any surviving
or remaining party to a thing or contract
in action, when the other party thereto
is dead, and his right in or to the thing or
contract has passed to a party on the
record who represents his interest in the
subject in controversy, as well as on the
incompetency of any other person whose
interest shall be adverse to the said right
of such dead person, Henry seeks to show
that his father instead of being, as lie presumptively is, indebted to him to the extent of $500, is indebted to him to the extent of $1000. So far as appears, Henry is
the sole heir of his father. He is also his
administrator. He may be said to represent, in a sense, the interest of his father.
The land of the latter has come to him.
But the judgments were liens, and
as such, conferred quasi-interests in
the land. The first judgment gave in
equity, primafacie, the right to $500 from
Samuel's land, in exoneration of Henry.
The second judgment gave to Harry Benner, the right to $5500 from the same land.

Henry Benner is now attempting by his
own testimony, to increase his own interest in this land, by virtue of the transaction between him and his father, to the
detriment of Benner. We think he is not
competent to do this.
But, Harry Benner received $1,000 from
Henry Paxson after Samuel's death and
assigned to him the judgment, marking it
to Henry Paxson's use. So far as appears.
there was no other means of paying the
judgment than this land. Benner had the
second judgment, and must have been
aware that Henry Paxson sought the assignment on the record as a means of obtaining payment upon it in preference to
himself. This act of Benner's, unexplained, sufficiently indicates that in his opinion, Samuel Paxson was the only principal
debtor, and that Henry was his surety
only. The auditor therefore erred. Henry
Paxson should have been paid $1,000 and
the residue only should have been applied
to Harry Benner.
SAMUEL WILSON vs. THE ESTATE
OF GEO. HARRISON, DECEASED.
Liens- Widow's exemption-Administrator liabilities.
Two exceptions to an auditor's report.
FRED D. OILER and JOHN G. MILLER
for plaintiff.
1. The auditor erred in allowing the
widow's exemption on the first lien. Berlin v. Getz, 5 Sup. Ct. 71; Miller's Appeal,
122 Pa. 95.
2. The administrator of an estate has no
right to pay taxes or insurance premiums.
Walker's Appeal, 116 Pa. 419; Emma E.
Fross' Appeal, 105 Pa. 259.
3. 'lhe auditor erred in allowing the
credit of thirty dollars for funeral expenses.
Wade's Appeal, 29 Pa. 328; Bryan's Estate, 7 Phila. 228.
ISAIAH SHEELINE and THos. M. MeCCACHRAN for defendant.
1. The lien of the widow's exemption
takes precedence to the lien of the judgment creditor. Nott's Appeal, 45 Pa. 361;
Appeal of City of Allentown 109 Pa. 75;
Davis' Appeal, 1 Phila. 360; Aill v. Hill,
32 Pa. 511.
2. An administrator has only a naked
power to sell and is not responsible for
rents collected by him. Fross' Appeal,
105 Pa. 258; Walker's Appeal, 116 Pa. 419;
Shissler's Estate, 20 W. PN. . 334; Graham's Estate, 6 Kulp. 169.
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3. It is not only a power, but a duty of
the administrator to insure the estate of
the decedent against fire, Johnson's Estate, 3 W. N. 364.
STATEMENT OF CASE.

George Harrison died intestate in 1897,
leaving surviving him a widow and three
sons. He left a farm and a little personal
property. All the personal property was
appraised to the widow under the act of
'51. It amounting to only $178, the remainder, $122, was decreed to be paid to
her out of the proceeds of the real estate.
The real estate was bound by three liens
of record: the first a judgment note for
$300 and the last also a judgment note for
$1400, both held by Samuel Wilson, and
the intermediate one a mortgage for $200
held by Jacob Marlan. Under an order
of court for the sale of the real estate for
payment of debts, the farm was sold for
$2100. The sale was held December, 1897,
and possession was given, under the conditions, on April 1, 1898. The fire insurance policy expiring on January 1, 1898,
the administrator re-insured the buildings
at a cost of $20. From the time of the decedent's death to April 1, 1898, the farm
was rented at a rental of $250 for the entire time.
The administrator filed his account and
an auditor was appointed and has filed his
report.
Wilson, the lien creditor, files the following exceptions:1. The auditor erred in allowing the
widow $122, by recognizing the balance of
her exemption as the first lien.
2. The auditor erred in not surcharging
the administrator with the amount of the
rent which was collected by him and not
accounted for.
3. The auditor erred in allowing the
administrator a credit for the amount of
the premium of insurance.
4. The auditor erred in allowing the
administrator a credit of $30 for funeral
expenses.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The first exception challenges the right
of the widow to receive her exemption out
of the fund. She had obtained $178 from
the personalty. The balance, $122, she
claims from the proceeds of the real estate.
Liens on this estate were, (1) a judgment
for $300, (2) a mortgage for $200, and (3) a

judgment for $1400. After deducting the
expense of the sale, and the allowances to
the administrator, the proceeds of the sale,
-the amount bid was $2100-are insufficient to pay these liens and the widow's
exemption.
The widow is allowed $300, by the act of
April 14, 1851, 1 P. & L. 1525, butnotsoas
to "affect or impair any liens for the purchase money of such real estate." She is
preferred to creditors having judgment
liens on the land, whose proceeds she
claims. 3 Trickett, Liens, 3M6. She is
postponed to a mortgage creditor, 3 Trickett, Liens, 252. Over lien (1) she has a
preference, but not over lien (2). Inasmuch
however, as lien (1) has a preference over
lien (2) and lien (2) a preference over the
widow's claim, lien (1) as well as lien (2)
must be both paid before her. 3 Trickett,
Liens, 252. But, after paying these liens
in full, there still remained more than
enough to satisfy the widow's demand. To
$122 of this residue, she was entitled, as
against lien (3). The first exception is
dismissed.
The 2nd exception complains that the
administrator has not been surcharged
with rents that were collected by him. As
administrator he had no right to the rents.
They belonged to the heirs of the decedent.
If he nevertheless, received them without
authority, or if he collected them, under a
warrant from the heirs, he must account to
them for the amount collected. He is not
chargeable with them as administrator,
nor can they properly be embraced in his
account. Cf. Fross' Appeal 105 Pa. 258;
Burnell's Estate, 9 W. N. C. 334; Klein's
Estate, 14 Pa. C. 0. 94: Bakes v. Reese,
150 Pa. 46; Haslage v. Krugh, 25 Pa. 97.
The fact that the administrator has ultimately to resort to the sale of the land, as
a resouroe for the payment of the debts,
does not make the rents accruing before
the sale, liable to appropriation to such
debts. It is neither the duty, nor the
right, of the administrator to so appropriate them. The second exception, which
indeed the exceptant has declared his wish
to withdraw, is dismissed.
The third exception complains that the
administrator has been allowed to take
from the fund the amount of money paid
by him as a premium, to effect insurance
on the premises which have been sold.
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The sale took place in December, 1897.
The insurance on the buildings was to expire on January 1,1898. The confirmation
of the sale was not to take place, and, in
fact, did not take place for some weeks
after the sale itself. Although an inceptive title rests in the purchaser, when the
land is knocked down to him, Holmes'
Appeal, 108 Pa. 23,so that judgments there-'
after recovered would become liens, if the
sale should be subsequently confirmed,
the court may for cause, decline to require
the purchaser to take the land, and a destruction of the buildings on it, prior to
confirmation, would induce it to refrain
-from confirming the sale. Demmy's Appeal, 43 Pa. 155.
An absolute title does
,not vest until confirmation and delivery of
the deed, Strange v. Austin, 134 Pa. 97;
Greenough v. Small, 137 Pa. 132; Emerick's
Estate, 172 Pa. 191.
Had a fire occurred
after January 1, 1898, the sale might have
aborted, and at another sale, less money
would have been obtained, by the amount
of the loss by fire. The creditors therefore, the payment of whose liens depended
on the price to be obtained at the administrator's sale, had a vital interest in the
preservation of the buildings from fire.
This interest was insurable. The administrator, as their quasi-agent, or trustees
had, we think, the power to insure this
interest. 1 Biddle Ins. 164; Herkimer v.
Rice, 27 N. Y. 163.
Perhaps he should
not have insured it for a longer time than
that which would probably intervene
before confirmation aid delivery of the
deed, and he would not, in strictness, be
entitled to a credit for so much of the
premium paid by him, as was paid for
insurance in excess of this reasonable time.
No effort has been made to show to what
extent the $20 paid, as a premium, was
excessive.
The third exception is dismissed.
'the 4th exception complains that the
auditor. has allowed.the administrator a
credit of $30 for funeral expenses. The
21st section of the act of Feb. 24th, 1834;
1 P. & L. 1432, directs that "All debts
owing by any person within this state, at
the time of his decease, shall be paid by
his executors or administrators, so far as
they have assets, in the manner and order
following: 1, Funeral expenses, medicine
furnished and medical attendance given

during the last illness of the decedent, and
servants' wages, not exceeding one year;
2, rents not exbeeding one year; 3, all other
debts, without regard to equality of the
same, except debts due to the commonwealth, which shall be last paid. "In the
sense of this statute, the proceeds of land
sold by the Orphans' Court, are doubtless
assets" from which the debts are to be paid
in the prescribed order, but this order is not
intended to displace the order of liens created in the decedent's lifetime. Judgments
and other liens must be paid from the proceeds ofthe land on which they are liens, in
preference to the funeral expenses, etc.
Wade's Appeal, 29 Pa. 329; Bryan's Estate, 7 Phila. 228; Hocker's Estate, 14
Phila. 659. It was error, therefore to permit the funeral expenses to be paid in
preference to Samuel Wilson, the owner
of the third lien, or judgment. The 4th
exception is sustained.
AMERICUS JOHNSON vs. NATHAN
ORRIS.
Innkeeper and guest.
Action for damages.
GERY and COLLINS for plaintiff.
Coming for temporary refreshments constitutes a guest.-Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa.
92; McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. 560.
An inkeeper is an insurer of his guests
goods.-Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 122;
Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick 280.
LIG1iTNER and BASEHOR for defendant.
Plaintiff was a visitor and not a guest.Hursh v. Byers, 29 Mo. 469; Carter v.
Hobbs, 12 MKich. 52; Mowers v. Fethers,
61"N. Y., 34.

Innkeeper is not an insurer of visitors'

goods.-Hawley v. Smith, 25 Wend. 642.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The plaintiff Americus Johnson was invited by the Carlisle Club to attend a banquet to be given by it at the Lion House.
The club had entered into a contract with
the keeper of the Lion House by which it
was agreed that a certain specified sum
should be paid for each plate furnished at
the banquet. When theguests of the club
arrived at the hotel they registered their
names, and a room was assigned to them,
which they occupied before going to the
banqueting room. When they did go to
the banqueting room they left their hats
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on a rack at the door of the room, from
which place they were stolen without the
negligence of tie innkeeper. The hatand
coat of the plaintiff was taken with the
others, and le brings this action against
the innkeeper, Nathan Orris, to recover
for the damages suffered.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Upon grounds of public policy, tie law
has subjected the innkeeper to a special
responsibility.for the goods of his guest.
An ordinary bailee is liable only for failure
to exercise the degree of care commensurate with the risk, but the innkeeper, like
the common carrier may be compelled to respond in damages without proof of negligence or fault. He is practicall, an insurer of the goods of his guest, except as
against such losses as are caused by the
act of God, or the public enem&-, or by the
conduct of the guest himself or of his servant, or the companion whom he brings
with him. Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92:
Walsh v. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376; Shultz
v. Wail, 134 Pa. 262; Hulett v. Swift, 33
N. Y. 571.
The insurer's liability will not be imposed, however, merely upon proof that
the plaintiff's goods were lost at the defendant's inn.
It must also appear that at
the time of the loss, the relation of innkeeper and guest existed -between the
parties; that the plaintiffwas at the inn
for purposes which the law recognizes as
the purpose for which inns are kept,,
namely, the accommodation and entertainment of travelers.
Calye's Case, 8
Coke 32 and note 1 Smith Lead.
Cases
131; Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52; Amey
v. Winchester, (Vt.) 39 L. R. A. 760.
'Does the case of the plaintiff meet these
requirements? We are of the opinion that
it does not. It may be admitted, for the
purpose of argument, that the plaintiff by
registering at the hotel and taking a room
became a guest of the house;, that 'f his hat
and coat had been stolen before he went to
the banquet hall or after he had returned
from the fea-t, or if while in attendance at
the banquet the hat and coat had been
stolen from his room, the defendant would
have beenliableasan innkeeper. But when
the plaintiff went to the banquet hall,
taking his hat and coat with him and
leaving them at the door, he withdrew

them from the protection of the defendant
as an innkeeper. He then became the
guest of the Carlisle Club, and as to the
club and its guests, the defendant sustained the relation, not of innkeeper but of
caterer. If the defendant had served the
dinner in a hall across the street from his
inn or in an adjoining building, it would
not be contended for a moment that he
would be liable as an innkeeper for goods
lost at the banquet. Nor would such a
contention be advanced if the banquet in
the dining hall of the inn had been provided by another caterer who had engaged
the room from the defendant for that purpose. Yet merely because in this case it
chanced that the caterer was an innkeeper, and the dinner was served in his inn.
we are asked to hold him responsible, not
as a caterer but as an innkeeper. The two
employments are entirely separate and
distilnct, and one may engage at the same
time in both. But in case one does, one
certainly should not be held responsible as
an innkeeper, when acting as a caterer.
At the time of the banquet, and as th the
property lost, the defendant was acting,
in relation to the plaintiff, as well as to all
in attendance at the banquet, as a caterer
and not as an innkeeper, and therefore he
is not liable for the plaintiffs loss in the
absence of proof of fault or negligence.
This view we believe to be supported by
autlkority. The case of Carter v. Hobbs,
12 Mich. 52, Is particularly instructive.
In that case it appeared that a ball was
given by a fire company at the inn of defendant, the defendant furnishing dancing-room, supper and dressing room, and
being paid therefor by the company at the
rate of one dollar for each supper ticket.
The plaintiff who was a guest at another
inn of the town, went to the ball, purchased a ticket therefor at the baggage
room, delivered his overcoat, fur collar and
gloves at the office of the hotel to the
clerk, and registered his name. He remained at the ball until early morning,
and-during the night bought liquor and
cigars at a saloon kept by the defendant
in- connection with the hotel. When he
called for his overcoat, collar and gloves,
they could not be found, and action was
brought by him against the innkeeper.
The court held that in the absence of proof
of negligence, no recovery could be had,
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and Christiancy, J., in the course of his
opinion said: "The plaintiff was no more
the guest of the inn than any person residing across the street and attending the
ball on the same occasion. If a guest at
all, he was rather the guest of the fire
company. The defendant on this particular occasion was no more acting in the
character of innkeeper as to those attending the ball, than any other person furnishingtherooms and supper, at any other
house, for such special occasion." Counsel
for the plaintiff made an ingenious attempt to distinguish this case from the
one at bar, but we think that essentially
the same question is presented by each. In
Carter v. Hobbs, the plaintiff was a guest

at another hotel at the time of the party
at the defendant's inn; in this case at bar
that fact does not appear. We have conceded, in this opinion, that he was a guest
at defendant's inn. But the difference is
immaterial. The essential point in both
cases is that at the time of the loss and as
to the property lost, the defendant sustained toward the plaintiff a relation
which was not that of innkeeper to guest.
In the recent case of Amey v. Winchester, supra, the facts were precisely the
same as in the case before us and the
learned court reached the same conclusion.
Judgment will be entered for the defendant.

